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THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBAL RECOGNITION PROCESS 
AND THE COURTS 
Roberto Iraola∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The federal government’s recognition of an American Indian group 
as a tribe enables the group to participate in federal assistance 
programs,1 establishes a government-to-government relationship 
between the United States and the tribe, and “imposes on the 
government a fiduciary trust relationship to the tribe and its members.”2  
 
∗ Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and Security at the 
Department of the Interior.  J.D. Catholic University Law School (1983).  The views expressed 
herein are solely those of the author and do not purport to reflect the views of the Department of the 
Interior. 
 1. As noted by one commentator, “[f]ederal recognition automatically qualifies tribes as 
eligible for multiple forms of federal assistance programs.  Services such as financial assistance and 
social services, loans to tribal members, housing improvement programs, and health services are 
just a few of the many services and benefits provided to qualified, eligible Indian tribes.”  R. 
Spencer Clift, III., The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes; Their Recent Dramatic 
Commercial Advancement; and Discussion of the Eligibility of Indian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy 
Code and Related Matters, 27 AM. IND. L. REV. 177, 195 (2003) (footnotes omitted); Alva C. 
Mather, Comment, Old Promises: The Judiciary and the Future of Native American Federal 
Acknowledgement Litigation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1827, 1833 (2003) (“Arguably the most important 
benefit associated with federal recognition is the Indian tribe’s eligibility for federal services.”).  See 
Federal Recognition for American Indian Tribes, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Barry T. Hill, 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Sept. 
17, 2002) (“In fiscal year 2002, the Congress appropriated about $5 billion for programs and 
funding almost exclusively for recognized tribes.”). 
 2. H.R. REP. NO. 103-781, at 2 (1994) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3768.  See William 
W. Quinn, Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: Authority, Judicial Interposition, 
and 25 C.F.R. Section 83, 17 AM. IND. L. REV. 37, 38 (1992) (“The acknowledgment establishes a 
special bilateral government-to-government relationship between the tribal goverment and the 
United States.  This status entitles the tribe to a variety of services and benefits, which are provided 
exclusively to American Indian tribes.”); Jackie J. Kim, Comment, The Indian Federal Recognition 
Administrative Procedures Act of 1995: A Congressional Solution to an Administrative Morass, 9 
ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 899, 902 (1995) (“Federal recognition of an Indian tribe creates a formal 
government-to-government relationship between the tribe and the United States.  This recognition 
guarantees benefits and services to Indian tribes by virtue of their status as tribes.”) (footnotes 
1
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One important potential benefit from “quasi-government status” as a 
result of recognition is the exemption from laws regulating gambling.3  
Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988,4 a tribe is permitted 
to operate casinos on lands that the government holds in trust if the state 
where the tribe is located allows gaming and the tribe enters into a 
compact with the state, which subsequently must be approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior.5  The revenues from gaming operations have 
proven to be an important source of funding for some tribal 
governments.6  In 2004, tribal casinos nationwide generated 
approximately $18.5 billion in revenues, twice the take of Nevada’s 
 
omitted).  In discussing tribal sovereignty, it is important to keep in mind that 
Indian tribes pre-existed the federal Union and draw their powers from their original 
status as sovereigns before European arrival.  Indian tribal sovereignty is a retained 
sovereignty, and includes all the powers of a sovereign that have not been divested by 
Congress or by tribes’ incorporation into the Federal Union.  As a result, tribal 
sovereignty is not ‘conferred’ upon tribes through federal recognition.  Rather, 
recognition is a process by which the Federal Government acknowledges that particular 
Indian entities retain their sovereign status. 
Oversight Hearing on the Tribal Acknowledgment Process: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on 
Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Tracy 
Toulou, Director, Office of Tribal Justice), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
otj/testimony_feb_07_2002.htm [hereinafter Toulou Testimony]. 
 3. GAO Report 02-49, Indian Issues: Improvements Needed in Tribal Recognition Process 
(Nov. 2, 2001) at  1, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0249.pdf (“The quasi-sovereign 
status created by this relationship exempts certain tribal lands from most state and local laws and 
regulations – including, where applicable, laws regulating gambling.”) [hereinafter GAO Report 02-
49); Clift, supra note 1, at 195 (“As a sovereign entity, officially recognized tribes are allowed to 
self govern and enjoy immunity from state taxation and regulations within tibal territory.  
Recognition as a tribe is also a prerequisite to being exempt from state laws or state constitutional 
provisions prohibiting casino gambling.”) (footnote omitted).  See generally California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (holding that tribes had authority to establish 
gambling operations on their reservations outside state regulation provided the state allowed 
gambling).  Quasi-government status also gives the recognized tribe additional powers including the 
power to establish a separate judiciary and to tax, as well as immunity from suit.  See Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing 
the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”); H.R. REP. NO. 
103-781, at 2-3 (1994) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3768 (“[Federal recognition] 
institutionalizes the tribe’s quasi-sovereign status, along with all the powers accompanying that 
status such as the power to tax, and to establish a separate judiciary.”) (footnotes omitted).  See 
generally Vicky J. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native 
American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 681, 685-86 
(1994) (discussing powers inherent in tribal self-government).     
 4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2004), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (2004).  See Rhode Island v. 
Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 689-90 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing the Gaming Act).   
 5. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2004).   
 6. See GAO Report 02-49, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that according to a report by the 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission for the period 1995 through 1999, “of the 561 
recognized tribes, only 193 tribes, or about 34 percent, actually participate[d] in gambling and only 
27 tribes (or about 5 percent) generate[d] more than $100 million on an annual basis.”)   
2
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casinos and more revenue than Mariott Hotels, A.G. Edwards and 
Starbucks combined.7 
Since 1978, the tribal recognition process principally has been 
governed through regulations promulgated by the Department of the 
Interior (the “Department” or “DOI”).8  Under the “federal 
acknowledgement process,” 9 regulations set forth the standard of 
evidence, burden of proof, criteria, and administrative procedures the 
executive branch of government utilizes in ascertaining whether a group 
is an Indian tribe.10  This article, which is divided into three parts, 
examines the regulations and the judicial gloss placed on them by the 
courts.  First, and by way of background, the article discusses how tribes 
historically were recognized.  The article then reviews in detail the 1978 
regulations as promulgated and amended.  Lastly, the article discusses 
how courts have responded to challenges to, and interpreted various 
aspects of, these regulations. 
 
 7. Electa Draper, Indian Gaming’s Future Eyed, DENVER POST, March 30, 2005, available 
at http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~53~2788770,00.html (last accessed Apr. 8, 2005) 
(“[The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] resulted in an Indian gambling industry in which more than 
220 tribes in 28 states pulled in $18.5 billion last year, about twice the take of Las Vegas casinos.”).  
Jodi Rave, Governors, Tribes Talk Gaming, BILLINGS GAZETTE, March 30, 2005, available at  
http://www.billingsgazette.com/index.php?id=1&display=rednews/2005/03/30/build/state/45-tribe-
gambling.inc (last accessed Apr. 8, 2005) (“Last year, tribal governments’ gross revenues from 
casinos topped $18.5 billion more revenue than Starbucks, A.G. Edwards and Mariott Hotels 
combined.”). 
 8. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 
25 C.F.R. §§ 83.1 – 83.13 (2004).  As explained more fully below, a tribe seeking federal 
recognition is not limited to the administrative process.  It may seek recognition directly from 
Congress.  See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1097 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003) (“Although Congress has recognized tribes through legislation in recent years, it is 
ordinarily up to the Secretary of the Interior, through a painstaking bureaucratic process, to 
determine whether the United States will recognize the sovereignty of a putative tribe.”); Emma 
Schwartz, Virginia Tribes Fight for Sovereignty, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004 at A12 (reporting on 
progress of six Virginia Indian tribes seeking to gain federal recognition from Congress before the 
400th anniversary of Jamestown’s founding); Peter Hardin, Senate May Vote on Recognizing 6 
Tribes, TIMES-DISPATCH, May 9, 2004, at B1 available at http://www.timesdispatch.com. 
 9. See Kim, supra note 2, at 899 (referring to program as the “federal acknowledgment 
process” or “FAP”) (footnote omitted); Rachael Paschal, Comment, The Imprimatur of Recognition: 
American Indian Tribes and the Federal Acknowledgement Process, 66 WASH. L. REV. 209 (1991); 
Mather, supra note 1, at 1838 (same).  
 10. See Barbara N. Coen, The Role of Jurisdiction in the Quest for Sovereignty: Tribal Status 
Decision Making: A Federal Perspective on Acknowledgment, 37 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 491, 491 
(2003) (“These regulations delineate the criteria, standard of evidence, burden of proof, and 
administrative procedures for federal acknowledgment utilized in determining whether a particular 
group is an Indian tribe.”); Quinn, supra note 2, at 40-41 (“It was not until the promulgation of the 
acknowledgment regulations in 1978 . . . that a systematic, uniform method for Indian groups to 
attain federal acknowledgment as Indian tribes was established.”). 
3
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II.  FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF INDIAN TRIBES – AN OVERVIEW 
The dominant role of Congress with respect to questions 
concerning a tribe’s sovereignty and title to land is derived from its 
power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes,”11 to 
“dispose of . . . Property belonging to the United States,”12 and to 
provide advice and consent in the formulation of treaties.13  While 
Congress has delegated the power to recognize tribes to the executive 
branch,14 it also has been argued that the executive branch, independent 
of the power delegated by Congress, has inherent power over Indian 
matters.15 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.; see FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
3 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed.) (“Historically, the federal government has determined 
that certain groups of Indians will be recognized as tribes for various purposes.  Such 
determinations are incident to the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which expressly 
grants Congress power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.’”) (footnote omitted) 
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]. 
 12. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2; see HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at  
209 (“The power of Congress under the Property Clause to dispose of and regulate ‘the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States’ has been considered an additional source of authority 
over Indian affairs”) (footnotes omitted).   
 13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties[.]”); see John W. Ragsdale, The United Tribe of 
Shawnee Indians: The Battle for Recognition, 69 UMKC L. REV. 311, 320 (2000) (“The paramount 
role of Congress stems from its constitutionally delegated control over federal property, its advisory 
role in the formulation of treaties, and its power ‘to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian 
tribes . . . .’”) (footnotes omitted); L.R. Weatherhead, What Is An “Indian Tribe”? – The Question 
of Tribal Existence, 8 AM. IND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980) ( “The powers over Indians conferred by the 
United States Constitution on the federal government spring principally from the treaty power and 
the commerce clause.”) (footnotes omited); Clift, supra note 1, at 184 (discussing Treaty Power and 
commerce clause). 
 14. See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 255 F.3d 
342, 345 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002) (“[T]he general view nowadays . . . is 
that Congress has the power, both directly and by delegation to the President, to establish criteria for 
recognizing a tribe.”).  See also Quinn, supra note 2, at 47-53 (discussing delegation under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 301 and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9); Clift, supra note 1, at 188 (“Congress has delegated regulation over 
tribes – although some consider the duty a nondelegable, constitutionally empowered responsibility 
– to the executive branch (i.e., the [Bureau of Indian Affairs].”). 
 15. See Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 13 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 272 (2001) (“In theory, the President could unilaterally recognize a tribe by 
taking action consistent with recognizing a foreign government, such as making a proclamation of 
recognition, establishing regular dealings with the tribe, or applying existing law to the tribe.  Power 
to undertake certain diplomatic and administrative actions consistent with federal recognition of 
tribes is constitutionally and statutorily committed to the executive branch.”).  One commentator 
maintains: 
Despite the legislature’s general preeminence in Indian affairs under the so-called Indian 
Commerce Clause, the federal government’s Indian authority is not wholly monopolized 
by Congress.  Rather, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty and the government-to-
government character of federal relations with Indian tribes – principles that necessarily 
4
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Historically, Indian tribes were granted recognition by the federal 
government through treaties.16  In 1871, this practice ceased17 and 
executive orders18 and legislation19 generally became the vehicles 
through which government recognition policy with respect to Indians 
was effected.20  Following the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act 
 
underpin the entire corpus of Indian affairs jurisprudence – suggest also an important 
role for the executive branch, particularly with respect to matters of tribal recognition.  
Despite the seeming assumption by generations of courts and commentators that federal 
power over Indian affairs is left entirely in the hands of Congress, there also exists an 
important independent presidential power.  That is, the fundamentally political nature of 
the federal-Indian relationship implicates the same constitutionally-given executive 
power involved in the recognition of sovereign governments in foreign relations. 
Christopher A. Ford, Executive Prerogatives in Federal Indian Jurisprudence: The Constitutional 
Law of Tribal Recognition, 73 DENVER U. L. REV. 141, 143 (1995).  But see Ragsdale, supra note 
13, at 321 (2000) (“The Supreme Court has never confirmed th[is] power[], however, and the 
executive role in the recognition of Indian tribes . . . has been carried out within the parameters of 
congressional delegation or acquiescence.”)  Perhaps, the best that can be said on this issue is that 
“the analogy to recognition of foreign governments has prevailed to the extent that Congress has 
delegated to the executive branch the power of recognition of Indian tribes without setting forth any 
criteria to guide the exercise of that power.”  Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc., 255 F.3d at 
345.    
 16. See Mather, supra note 1, at 1831 (“Historically, treaty negotiations were the ‘accepted 
method’ for establishing a legal relationship between an Indian tribe and the United States 
goverment.”) (footnote omitted).   
 17. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 41st Cong. ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (1870) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 
71 (2004)).  In Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51 (2d. Cir. 1994), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed: 
Numerous reasons were advanced for termination of Indian policy based on treaty 
negotiations.  After the War of 1812 the military importance of alliances with Indian 
tribes was diminished.  The movement to end treaty making gained strength as a result of 
alliances between some of the southern Indian tribes and the Confederacy.  The final 
decision to end treaty making resulted from a movement by members of the House of 
Representatives to equalize power between that body and the Senate through the removal 
of Indian relations from the treaty-making process. 
Id. at 57.   
 18. See Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a 
Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1472 (1991) (discussing how after Congress passed 
legislation ending treaty-making with Indian nations, for several decades, some “tribes received 
executive order reservations”).  In 1919, Congress abolished the practice of establishing 
reservations through executive order.  See Appropriations - Indian Department, Hastings 
Amendment, ch. 4, 41 Stat. 3 (1919) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 450 (2004)). 
 19. In the legislative context, “acknowledgement” must be distinguished from “restoration.”  
As one commentator explains, during the 1950s, “Congress terminated the government-to-
government relationship of several Indian tribes.  The termination policy subsequently failed.  The 
tribes once terminated have gradually been ‘restored’ to their  former legal statuses as federally 
acknowledged via congressional legislation, since the executive is precluded from acknowledging a 
congressionally terminated tribe.”  Quinn, supra note 2, at 42 n.21 (citations omitted).  See, e.g., 
Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Restoration Act of 1980, H.R. 4996, 96th Cong. (1980) (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (2004)). 
 20. See Henry Sockbeson, Reflections on a Flawed System, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 483, 485 
5
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of 1934,21 the Department became more involved in recognition 
determinations because benefits created by the Act flowed only to 
descendants of recognized Indian tribes.22 
Before the 1960s, the Department was able to assess each 
recognition request on an individual basis without any need for formal 
guidelines.23 Then, in the 1970s, a series of cases brought by Indian 
groups seeking to enforce trust obligations and treaty rights,24 and a 
report to Congress by the American Indian Policy Review Commission 
that criticized the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”)--in part for its 
inconsistent treatment of Indian groups--resulted in an increase in the 
number of requests.25  This led to the promulgation of regulations 
 
(2003) (“Subsequent to the treaty period, which ended in 1871, and until the adoption of federal 
recognition regulations, the federal goverment made recognition decisions through legislation, 
basically on an ad hoc basis.  As problems arose, they were resolved through legislation, or the 
President issued executive orders.”); Kim, supra note 2, at 905 (“Before the BIA implemented the 
FAP and its criteria, the United States relied on treaties, executive orders, legislation, and court 
decisions to determine whether a particular Indian group qualified for federal recognition as an 
Indian tribe.”) (footnotes omitted).  See generally Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 
1202 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The federal government has formally recognized the rights of Indians to 
specified areas of land through treaties with tribes and by statute and executive order.”).  With 
respect to court decisions, one commentator points out: 
It is more exact . . . to say that courts can confirm a recognition after examining the 
treaties, statutes and executive orders to determine whether or not a political relationship 
has been established and maintained.  Congress itself has stated that court decision can 
be the basis for recognition, but this is likely an observation of the court’s interpretative 
powers rather than a concession that the judiciary has an independent power to establish 
political relationships for the federal government. 
Ragsdale, supra note 13, at 322-23 (footnotes omitted).  See also Kim, supra note 2, at 905 
(clarifying the observation made by some that tribal recognition can come about as a result of court 
decision).  See generally Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(“Whether a group constitutes a ‘tribe’ is a matter that is ordinarily committed to the discretion of 
Congress and the Executive Branch, and courts will defer to their judgment.”); HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 3 (“For most current purposes, judicial deference to 
findings of tribal existence is still mandated by the extensive nature of congressional power in the 
field.”) 
 21. 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494 (2004)); see Mather, supra note 1, 
at 1830-31 (discussing the purpose of the Act).   
 22. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians, 39 F.3d at 57 (“After passage of the Indian 
Reorganization Act recognition proceedings were necessary because the benefits created by it were 
made available only to descendants of ‘recognized’ Indian tribes.”).   
 23. See GAO Report 02-49, supra note 3, at 3 (“Until the 1960s, the limited number of 
requests by groups to be federally recognized permitted the Department to assess a group’s status on 
a case-by-case basis without formal guidelines.”). 
 24. See Sockbeson, supra note 20, at 487-489 (discussing key cases); Paschal, supra note 9, at 
210-11 (same). 
 25. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 
43 Fed. Reg. 39, 361 (Sept. 5, 1978) (noting how an increase in the number of requests for 
acknowledgment in the 1970s “necessitate[d] the development of procedures to enable the 
Department to take a uniform approach in their evaluation.”). 
6
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establishing policies and procedures to govern the acknowledgment of 
Indian tribes in 1978.26  These regulations, presently codified at 25 
C.F.R. §§ 83.1 – 83.13,27 are discussed in detail below.28 
III.  THE REGULATORY PROCESS 
The Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs (the “Assistant 
Secretary”) is responsible for promoting self-determination on behalf of 
the 562 federally recognized tribes and fulfilling the Department’s trust 
responsibilities.29  He also oversees the Bureau of Indian Affairs, an 
 
 26. See Kim, supra note 2, at 906 (identifying two main factors that led to promulgation of 
regulations as report by American Indian Policy Review Commission and cases involving treaty 
rights and trust obligations); Dan Gunter, The Technology of Tribalism: The Lemhi Indians, Federal 
Recognition, and the Creation of Tribal Identity, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 95 (1998) (same).   
 27. Originally codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 54, see 43 Fed. Reg. 39,361 (Sept. 5, 1978), the 
regulations were renumbered in 1982 at 25 C.F.R. Part 83.  See Coen, supra note 10, at 491 n.2.  In 
1994, the regulations were amended.  See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian 
Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 59 Fed. Reg. 9280, 9280-9300 (Feb. 25, 1994).  The changes 
entailed clarifying the requirements for acknowledgment and standards of evidence, reducing the 
burden of proof for those groups which could demonstrate prior Federal acknowledgment, providing 
independent review of decisions, revising timeframes for actions, providing an opportunity for a 
formal hearing, and defining access to records.  Id. at 9280   
 28. The Department also promulgated guidelines to the regulations which are available to the 
public.  See The Official Guidelines to the Federal Acknowledgment Regulations, 25 C.F.R. § 83 
(Dept. 1997) [hereinafter Guidelines].  The regulations were promulgated in part under the general 
statutory authority found in 25 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) (“The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under 
the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may 
prescribe, have the management of all Indian Affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian 
relations.”); 25 U.S.C. § 9 (2004) (“The President may prescribe such regulations as he may think 
fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs, and for 
settlement of the accounts of Indian affairs.”); and  43 U.S.C. § 1457 (2004) (“The Secretary of the 
Interior is charged with the supervision of public business relating to the following subjects and 
agencies: . . . 10. Indians.”).  The regulations were the result of extensive consultation, discussion 
and comment.  As reflected in the preamble, the input consisted of: 
400 meetings, discussions and conversations about Federal acknowledgment with other 
Federal agencies, State government officials, tribal representatives, petitioners, 
congressional staff members, and legal representatives of petitioning groups; 60 written 
comments on the initial proposed regulations on June 16, 1977; a national conference on 
Federal acknowledgment attended by approximately 350 representatives of Indian tribes 
and organizations; and 34 comments on the revised proposed regulations, published on 
June 1, 1978. 
43 Fed. Reg. 39,361 (Sept. 5, 1978). 
 29. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Martin Issues Final Determination to 
Decline Federal Acknowledgement of the Snohomish Tribe of Indians (Dec. 2, 2003) [hereinafter 
Snohomish Tribe Press Release], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/031202a.htm.  Under the 
regulations, the Department must periodically publish a list of all federally acknowledged tribes in 
the Federal Register.  25 C.F.R. § 83.5(a) (2004).  While the regulations require that the list be 
published at least every three years, id., under the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-454, §104, 108 Stat. 4791 (1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 479a-1 (2004)), 
7
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agency of approximately 10,500 employees that provides services to 
close to 1.4 million Alaska Natives and American Indians from federally 
recognized tribes, and the Office of Federal Acknowledgement (“OFA”), 
which administers the federal acknowledgement process.30  The OFA 
directly reports to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian 
Affairs31 and is staffed by three anthropologists, three historians, three 
genealogists, a secretary, and a director.32 
A.  Standing 
The regulations provide that only “American Indian groups33 
indigenous to the continental United States34 which are not currently 
acknowledged as Indian tribes by the Department” may petition for 
recognition.35  Organizations, corporations, associations, or recently 
formed groups may not be acknowledged.36  Similarly, political factions, 
 
the list must be published annually.   
 30. See Snohomish Tribe Press Release, supra note 29; Interior Department Tribal 
Recognition Process, Hearing Before Comm. on House Government Reform, 108th Cong. (2004) 
(statement of Theresa Rosier, Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs) (“The Federal 
acknowledgement process is implemented by the Office of Federal Acknowledgment . . . formerly 
the Branch of Acknowledgement and Research.”) [hereinafter Rosier Testimony].  
 31. See Rosier Testimony, supra note 30 (“Previously, the Branch of Acknowledgement and 
Research reported through the Office of Tribal Services and the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the 
Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs.  This realignment eliminated two layers of review and now 
provides more direct and efficient policy guidance.”).  The regulations generally refer to the 
“Assistant Secretary” as the final decision maker.  They define Assistant Secretary as “the Assistant 
Secretary – Indian Affairs, or that officer’s authorized representative.”  By order of the Secretary of 
the Interior dated April 9, 2004, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs was 
delegated the authority to “perform all . . . duties relating to the federal recognition of  Native 
American tribes, taking land into trust for gaming purposes, and other gaming maters.”  Secretarial 
Order No. 3252, Authorities Delegated to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs 
(Apr. 9, 2004) available at http://elips.doi.gov/elips/sec_orders/html_orders/3252.htm.   
 32. Rosier Testimony, supra note 30 (“OFA is staffed with a director, a secretary, three 
anthropologists, three genealogists, and three historians.”).  
 33. The regulations define an “Indian group” or “group” as “any Indian or Alaska Native 
aggregation within the continental United States that the Secretary of the Interior does not 
acknowledge to be a tribe.”  25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (2004).   
 34. The regulations define “continental United States” as the “contiguous 48 states and 
Alaska.”  Id.  Native Hawaiians groups are not covered by the regulations.  See Kahawaiolaa v. 
Norton, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1221 (D. Haw. 2002) (dismissing action by Native Hawaiian seeking 
recognition as tribe under the regulations finding they did not facially apply and that the issue of 
recognition presented “a political question inappropriate for judicial review”).    
 35. 25 C.F.R. § 83.3(a) (2004).  Thus, “Indian tribes, organized bands, pueblos, Alaska Native 
villages, or communities which are already acknowledged as such and are receiving services from 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs may not be reviewed under the procedures established by [the] 
regulations.”  Id. § 83.3(b).  
 36. Id. § 83.3(c).  If a group meets the criteria for recognition, its decision to incorporate will 
have no bearing on the final decision reached by the Assistant Secretary.  Id.  
8
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splinter groups, or any other groups that separate from the body of an 
acknowledged tribe,37 or groups subject to legislation forbidding or 
terminating recognition as a tribe, may not be acknowledged.38  Finally, 
groups whose petitions have been previously denied may not avail 
themselves of the administrative acknowledgement process.39 
B.  Letter of Intent, Petition, and Notice 
The recognition process starts with an Indian group filing a letter of 
intent requesting acknowledgement, signed by the group’s governing 
body, with the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs (the “Assistant 
Secretary”).40  At the same time or later, the group must also submit a 
documented petition signed by the group’s governing body setting forth 
why it meets the seven criteria that are required for recognition.41  The 
Assistant Secretary has thirty days to acknowledge receipt of the letter or 
the documented petition (if no letter of intent was ever served), and sixty 
days to publish notice of the letter of intent or petition in the Federal 
Register and a major newspaper or newspapers of general circulation in 
the city or town nearest the petitioner.42  The Assistant Secretary also 
 
 37. Id. § 83.3(d).   
 38. Id. § 83.3(e).  See United Auburn Indian Community, 24 I.B.I.A. 33 (1993) (ruling that 
Department of the Interior lacked the administrative authority to restore recognition of Indian tribe 
that was lawfully terminated pursuant to legislation). 
 39. 25 C.F.R. § 83.3(g)   
 40. Id. § 83.4. 
 41. Id. §§ 83.4(b), 83.6(a)-(c).  The seven criteria are discussed in detail below.  See infra 
notes 45-57 and accompanying text.  After submitting a letter of intent, a group has “unlimited time 
under the regulations in which to prepare and submit a documented petition.”  See Guidelines, supra 
note 28, at 8.   
 42. 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.9(a), (c).  The notice, which provides background information (i.e., name, 
location, and mailing address) about the petitioner, is designed in part to provide an “opportunity for 
interested parties and informed parties to submit factual or legal arguments in support of or in 
opposition to the petitioner’s request for acknowledgement and/or request to be kept informed of all 
general actions affecting the petition.”  Id. § 83.9(a).  An “interested party” is “any person, 
organization or other entity who can establish legal, factual or property interest in an 
acknowledgement determination and who requests an opportunity to submit comments or evidence 
or to be kept informed of general actions regarding a specific petitioner.”  Id. § 83.1.  It includes the 
governor and attorney general of petitioner’s state, and may include local government units and 
unrecognized or recognized Indian groups that may be affected by the determination.  Id.  See In re 
Federal Acknowledgment of the Snoqualmie Tribal Organization, 34 I.B.I.A. 22 (1999) (stating that 
the definition of interested party under the regulation reflects “an intent to broaden the scope of 
those entitled to participate in the Departmental acknowledgement proceedings beyond the range of 
those entitled to intervene in Federal court proceeding under FED. R. CIV. PROC. 24, at least with 
respect to local governmental units, recognized Indian tribes, and unrecognized Indian groups”); In 
re Federal Acknowledgment of the Match-e-be-nash-she-wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of 
Michigan, 33 I.B.I.A. 291 (1999) (ruling that interested party status is not restricted to local 
government units in the immediate vicinity of the group seeking acknowledgement and that such 
9
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must notify, in writing, the governor and the attorney general of the state 
where the petitioner is located,43 as well as any recognized tribe or other 
petitioning tribe that “appears to have a historical or present relationship 
with the petitioner or which may otherwise be considered to have a 
potential interest in the acknowledgement determination.”44 
C.  The Contents of the Petition and Level of Proof 
For a group seeking tribal recognition to succeed, it must satisfy 
seven criteria.45  Specifically, the group must demonstrate that: (i) it “has 
been identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially 
continuous basis since 1900;”46 (ii) a predominant portion of it 
“comprises a distinct community and has existed as a historical 
community from historical times until the present;”47 (iii) it “has 
maintained political influence or authority over its members as an 
autonomous entity from historical times until the present;”48 (iv) it has 
 
party may file a request for reconsideration of a final decision before the Board even if it did not 
participate in the original proceedings before the Assistant Secretary).  An “informed party” is a 
person or entity other than an interested party “who requests an opportunity to submit comments or 
evidence or to be kept informed of general actions regarding a specific petitioner.”  25 C.F.R. § 
83.1.    
 43. 25 C.F.R. § 83.9(b).  As noted previously, the governor and attorney general of a 
petitioner’s state are considered “interested parties.”  Id. § 83.1. 
 44. Id. § 83.9(b).     
 45. Id. § 83.6(c).  The regulations provide that a petition “must include thorough explanations 
and supporting documentation in response to all of the criteria” and that the “criteria should be read 
carefully” taking into account the regulations’ definitions.  Id. 
 46. Id. § 83.7(a).  In determining a group’s Indian identity, factors to consider include: 
(1) Identification as an Indian entity by Federal authorities. 
(2) Relationships with State governments based on identification of the group as Indian. 
(3) Dealings with a county, parish, or other local government in a relationship based on 
the group’s Indian identity. 
(4) Identification as an Indian entity by anthropologists, historians, and/or other scholars. 
(5) Identification as an Indian entity in newspapers and books. 
(6) Identification as an Indian entity in relationships with Indian tribes or with national, 
regional, or state Indian organizations. 
Id. 
 47. Id. § 83.7(b).  The regulations define community as “any group of people which can 
demonstrate that consistent interactions and significant social relationships exist within its 
membership and that its members are differentiated from and identified as distinct from 
nonmembers.” Id. § 83.1.  They also provide guidance on the type of evidence needed to establish 
this criterion.  Id. § 83.7(b)(1)-(2).  See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. v. Babbitt, 112 F. Supp. 2d 
742, 747-48 (N.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The Department reads the 
regulations as requiring that the petitioning tribe’s members meet and interact, that the petitioning 
tribe’s members be seen as American Indian, and that the petitioning tribe be a dynamic group 
rather than simply many people with common Indian ancestors.”).   
 48. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(c).   
10
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submitted a copy of its “present governing documents including its 
membership criteria;”49 (v) its “membership consists of individuals who 
descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes 
which combined and functioned as a single autonomous political 
entity;”50 (vi) the group’s membership “is composed principally of 
persons who are not members of any acknowledged North American 
Indian tribe;”51 and (vii) neither the group nor its members “are the 
subject of congressional legislation that has expressly terminated or 
forbidden the Federal relationship.”52 
Conclusive proof is not required to establish any of the seven 
criteria.53  Rather, a criterion will be met “if the available evidence 
establishes a reasonable likelihood of the validity of the facts relating to 
that criterion.”54  Furthermore, while the regulations provide guidance on 
the type of evidence a group may want to rely upon to establish certain 
of the criteria,55 such evidence is not mandatory.56  A group may 
establish any of those criteria by suitable evidence that demonstrates the 
requirements of the criterion at issue, which includes its related 
 
 49. Id. § 83.7(d).  
 50. Id. § 83.7(e).  The types of evidence that may be used to satisfy this criterion are set forth 
in subsections (e)(1)(i) through (e)(1)(v).  See Ramapough Mountain Indians v. Babbitt, No. 98-
2136, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14479, at *9 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 30, 2000) (“The works of 
anthropologists, historians and other scholars, as well as newspapers and books, are acceptable to 
satisfy the identification requirement of criterion (a), but records are required to satisfy criterion 
(e).”).  The group must provide an official list of its members certified by the group’s governing 
body, as well as a list of the group’s former members based on the group’s criteria.  25 C.F.R. § 
83.7(e)(2).    
 51. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(f).  Even if the membership of the group is comprised of persons who 
have been associated with, or appeared on the rolls of, an acknowledged Indian tribe, the group may 
still meet this criterion if “it has functioned throughout history until the present as a separate 
autonomous Indian tribal entity, . . . its members do not maintain a bilateral political relationship 
with the acknowledged tribe, and . . . its members have provided written confirmation of their 
membership in the petitioning group.”  Id.  
 52. Id. § 83.7(g).   
 53. Id. § 83.6(d).   
 54. Id.  In rejecting preponderance of the evidence as the applicable standard in 
acknowledgment decisions, the Department noted during its revision of the regulations in 1994: 
‘Preponderance’ is a legal standard focused on weighing evidence for versus against a 
position.  It is not appropriate for the present circumstances where the primary question 
is usually whether the level of evidence is high enough, even in the absence of negative 
evidence, to demonstrate meeting a criterion, for example, showing that political 
authority has been exercised. 
Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 59 Fed. Reg. 
9280 (Feb. 25, 1994).     
 55. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a)-(c).   
 56. Id. § 83.6(g). 
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definitions.57 
D.  Previously Acknowledged Groups 
If a group can provide substantial evidence of prior federal 
acknowledgement,58 its burden is lessened in the following manner.59  
First, it need demonstrate that it has been identified as an American 
Indian entity only “since the point of last Federal acknowledgement.”60  
Second, the group does not need to demonstrate that it existed as a 
distinct community historically, only that it presently comprises a 
distinct community.61  Lastly, the group need only show present political 
influence or authority over its members.62  The group also must meet the 
requirements of the remaining four criteria.63 
E.  Preliminary Review 
Upon receipt of a documented petition, OFA conducts a 
“preliminary review of the petition for purposes of technical 
assistance.”64  The purpose of this review is to identify deficiencies or 
important omissions in the petition and provide the group with an 
opportunity to withdraw the petition or address the deficiencies and/or 
 
 57. Id.  The definitions provided in § 83.1 “are an integral part of the regulations, and the 
criteria should be read carefully with these definitions.”  Id. § 83.6(c).  
 58. The regulations define “previous federal acknowledgement” as “any action by the Federal 
government clearly premised on identification of a tribal political entity and indicating clearly the 
recognition of a relationship between that entity and the United States.”  25 C.F.R. § 83.1.  Such 
acknowledgement may be established by: 
(1) Evidence that the group has had treaty relations with the United States. 
(2) Evidence that the group has been denominated a tribe by act of Congress or 
Executive Order. 
(3) Evidence that the group has been treated by the Federal Government as having 
collective rights in tribal lands or funds. 
Id. § 83.8(c)(1)-(3).   
 59. Id. § 83.8(a). 
 60. Id. § 83.8(d)(1).  The group also “must have been identified by such sources as the same 
tribal entity that was previously acknowledged or as a portion that has evolved from that entity.”  Id. 
 61. Id. § 83.8(d)(2).  
 62. Id. § 83.8(d)(3). 
 63. Id. § 83.8(d)(4).  One commentator maintains that the Department’s promulgative 
authority over tribes whose existence had been acknowledged by Congress, the executive, or the 
courts prior to the regulations is open to question.  See Ragsdale, supra note 13, at 338 (“It is one 
thing to find implicit authority in the BIA to promulgate regulations and adjudicate with respect to 
previously unacknowledged tribes; it is quite another to find implicit power in an agency to 
unilaterally terminate a formally-established, nation-to-nation relationship, to abrogate treaties or to 
counter Supreme Court opinions.”). 
 64. 25 C.F.R. § 83.10(b) (2004). 
12
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omissions.65  If the petition contains evidence of, or claims previous 
federal acknowledgement, OFA determines whether the evidence is 
sufficient to trigger the lesser standard that is applicable to previously 
acknowledged groups.66 
OFA also must investigate any petition which, together with a 
response to deficiencies identified during the technical review, possesses 
little or no evidence of the last three of the seven criteria needed for 
acknowledgment.67  If the evidence presented “clearly establishes” that 
the group does not meet either of these three criteria, then it is not 
necessary to consider the petition under the remaining criteria.68  If, on 
the other hand, the review does not clearly demonstrate that the group 
does not meet one or more of the last three mandatory criteria, then a full 
evaluation of the petition under all seven criteria must be undertaken.69 
F.  Active Consideration and Proposed Findings 
After the deficiencies and/or omissions in the preliminary review 
are addressed, the petition is placed in active consideration.70  The group 
and interested parties are notified of this action and provided with the 
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of OFA staff involved.71  If 
there has been any substantive comment filed in connection with the 
petition prior to it being placed on active consideration or during the 
preparation of the proposed finding, the petitioning group must be given 
an opportunity to respond to such comments.72 
Within one year after notifying the petitioning group that its 
petition was placed in active consideration, the Assistant Secretary must 
 
 65. Id. § 83.10(b)(1)-(2).  During this process, if a group submits materials in response to a 
deficiency identified during the technical review of the petition, additional review of those materials 
will be undertaken only if the group requests it.  Id. § 83.10(c)(1).   
 66. Id. § 83.10(b)(3); see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.  If the technical review 
process results in a request for additional evidence before a determination is made with respect to 
prior federal acknowledgment and the group declines to provide it, then its petition will be treated as 
one which does not claim prior federal acknowledgement.  Id. § 83.10(c)(2).   
 67. Id. § 83.10(e); see supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.  
 68. 25 C.F.R. § 83.10(e)(1) (2004).  In this case, the group is denied acknowledgement and a 
finding to that effect is published in the Federal Register.  Id.  The period for receipt of comments to 
the proposed findings and the publication of a final determination are discussed in Section G below. 
 69. Id. § 83.10(e)(2).  
 70. The date the group is advised that the petition has been placed on active consideration 
determines the order in which petitions are considered.  Id. § 83.10(d).  When two or more 
documented petitions are found ready for active consideration on the same date, the register of 
incomplete petitions or of letters of intent determines the order of consideration.  Id.   
 71. Id. § 83.10(f)(1). 
 72. Id. § 83.10(f)(2).   
13
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publish proposed findings in the Federal Register.73  This period may be 
extended an additional 180 days at the Assistant Secretary’s discretion.74  
The proposed findings must be accompanied by a report which 
summarizes the evidence and sets forth the reasoning and analyses used 
in arriving at the proposed findings.75  Copies of this report must be 
provided to the petitioning group and interested and informed parties, 
and also be available to others, if requested in writing.76 
G.  Response and Consultation 
After publication of the proposed findings, the petitioning group or 
any organization or individual wishing to support or challenge those 
findings has 180 days to submit comments and evidence.77  Upon a 
finding of “good cause,” the comment period may be extended an 
additional 180 days.78 
During the response period (and to the extent permissible by law), 
the Assistant Secretary shall make available to the petitioning group any 
records used in the proposed finding which the group does not already 
have.79  Also, if requested by the group or an interested party, the 
Assistant Secretary must hold an on-the-record meeting addressing the 
analyses, reasoning, and factual support for the proposed finding.80  At 
the conclusion of the comment period, the Assistant Secretary must 
consult with the petitioning group and any interested parties to determine 
a schedule for the consideration of the evidence and comments 
submitted.81 
H.  Final Determination and Reconsideration 
Within sixty days of the date of consideration of the comments and 
evidence, the Assistant Secretary must publish a final determination in 
the Federal Register.82  This determination becomes final ninety days 
 
 73. Id. § 83.10(h). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. § 83.10(i).   
 78. Id.  Any informed or interested parties who submit comments or evidence must provide 
the petitioning group with copies of their submissions.  Id.  A petitioning group has at least sixty 
days to respond to any submissions by informed or interested parties.  Id. § 83.10(k).  This period 
may be extended at the discretion of the Assistant Secretary.  Id.  
 79. Id. § 83.10(j)(1). 
 80. Id. § 83.10(j)(2).  
 81. Id. § 83.10(l). 
 82. Id. § 83.10(l)(2).  This period may be extended “if warranted by the extent and nature of 
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after publication, unless a group or interested party files a request for 
reconsideration with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (the 
“Board”).83 
The Board has the authority to consider a timely request for 
reconsideration that alleges new evidence,84 challenges as unreliable a 
substantial portion of the evidence relied upon in the final determination, 
questions the interpretation of the evidence, or challenges as inadequate 
or incomplete the research associated with the petition.85  The Board 
may order a hearing before an administrative law judge if it finds that 
there are genuine issues of material fact that need to be resolved, or the 
record before it augmented.86  If the petitioning group or interested party 
fails to establish any one of the grounds identified above by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the Board must affirm the decision of the 
Assistant Secretary.87  If the Board affirms the decision but determines 
that the alleged grounds for reconsideration went beyond the four criteria 
described above, it must send the request for reconsideration to the 
Secretary of the Interior.88  The Secretary has the discretion to ask the 
 
evidence and arguments received during the response period.”  Id. § 83.10(l)(3).   
 83. Id. §§ 83.10(l)(4) & 83.11(a)(1)-(2).  If the Assistant Secretary concludes that the 
petitioning group does not satisfy the governing criteria, and therefore, federal acknowledgement is 
not warranted, he must advise the group of alternatives to achieving Indian tribe status or through 
which its members may become members of an acknowledged tribe or eligible for benefits from the 
Department.  Id. § 83.10(n).  The Board has ruled consistently that the acknowledgement 
regulations are binding on the Department when presented with the question of which Indian 
entities should be considered “Indian tribes” under regulations and statutes which do not define the 
term.  See Edwards, McCoy & Kennedy and Western Shoshone Business Council of the Duck 
Valley Reservation, 18 I.B.I.A. 454 (1990); Northwest Computer Supply, 16 I.B.I.A. 125 (1988). 
 84. In In re Federal Acknowledgment of the Match-e-be-nash-she-wish Band of Pottawatomi 
Indians of Michigan, 33 I.B.I.A. 291 (1999), the Board ruled that documents which are alleged to 
represent new evidence must be so labeled and that where the Board cannot ascertain, “with 
reasonable diligence, what evidence is claimed to be new,” a request for reconsideration on that 
ground will be rejected.  See also In re Federal Acknowledgment of the Golden Hill Paugussett 
Tribe, 32 I.B.I.A. 216 (1998) (“[T]he term ‘new evidence’ as that term is used in 25 C.F.R. Section 
83.11(d)(1), includes only evidence that was not before the Assistant Secretary when she issued her 
Final Determination.”).   
 85. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(d)(1)-(4) (2004); see In re Federal Acknowledgment of the Mobile-
Washington County Band of Choctaw Indians of South Alabama, 34 I.B.I.A. 63 (1999) (“[I]n order 
for a petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its research was inadequate or 
incomplete in some material respect, it must show, at a minimum, that additional research would 
produce material information not previously considered by the BIA.”)  
 86. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(e)(4). 
 87. Id. §§ 83.11(e)(9) & (10).  If the interested party or petitioning group establishes one or 
more of the grounds identified above by a preponderance of the evidence, then the Board must 
vacate the Assistant Secretary’s determination and remand the case for further consideration.  Id. § 
83.11(e)(10). 
 88. Id. § 83.11(f)(2).  Section 83.11(f) has been interpreted to allow the Board to refer to the 
Secretary issues for clarification that “might not rise to the level of ‘grounds for reconsideration.’  
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Assistant Secretary to reconsider the final determination on those 
grounds.89  If he declines, the Assistant Secretary’s determination 
becomes final.90  If the Secretary asks the Assistant Secretary to 
reconsider, then the Assistant Secretary has 120 days to issue his 
reconsidered determination, which becomes final upon notice of 
publication in the Federal Register.91 
As of July 2004, OFA had received 213 letters of intent from tribal 
groups seeking recognition and sixty-nine incomplete petitions.92  Six 
petitions were on active consideration, and an additional thirteen 
completed petitions were awaiting consideration.93  Three final 
determinations were under review by the Board following requests for 
reconsideration. 94 
IV. THE CASE LAW 
If the petitioning group is recognized as a tribe, it becomes “eligible 
for the services and benefits that . . . are available to other federally 
recognized tribes” and also “to the privileges and immunities available 
to other federally recognized historic tribes by virtue of their 
government-to-government relationship with the United States.”95  But 
what if the group is denied recognition as an Indian tribe?  Can it obtain 
judicial review from such a ruling?  What happens if a group seeks 
 
Absent such an interpretation, [it has been found,] matters which the Board identified as requiring 
clarification but over which the Board lacks jurisdiction, would simply languish, with no apparent 
possibility of correction within the Department.”  In re Federal Acknowledgement of the 
Ramapough Mountain Indians, Inc., 31 I.B.I.A. 61 (1997).  Interested parties and the petitioning 
group have thirty days after notification of the Board’s decision to submit comments to the 
Secretary.  25 C.F.R. § 83.11(f)(4).  The Secretary has sixty days after receipt of all comments to 
determine whether to ask the Assistant Secretary to reconsider the decision.  Id. § 83.11(f)(5). 
 89. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(f)(2) (2004).   
 90. Id. § 83.11(h)(2). 
 91. Id. §83.11(g)(1), (h)(3).  The same time frame (120 days) governs a remand from the 
Board.  Id. § 83.11(g)(1).  
 92. ASSISTANT SEC’Y – INDIAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF FED. ACKNOWLEDGMENT, SUMMARY - 
STATUS OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT CASES (July 1, 2004).   
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  See 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(a)(1) (“Upon publication of the Assistant Secretary’s 
determination in the Federal Register, the petitioner or any interested party may file a request for 
reconsideration with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals.”).   
 95. 25 C.F.R. §83.12(a) (2004).  Since only Congress can abrogate a treaty, United States v. 
Washington, 641 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1981), a tribe’s failure to be recognized administratively 
does not affect its vested treaty rights.  See Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1203 
(10th Cir. 2002); Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1995); cf. W. Shoshone Bus. 
Council v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1058 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that an unrecognized tribe had no 
standing to obtain statutory benefits under 25 U.S.C. § 81).  See generally Weatherhead, supra note 
13, at 30-40 (discussing definition of tribe involving treaty rights). 
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judicial recognition without first obtaining an administrative decision 
from the Assistant Secretary?  Can the court consider such a request, or 
must the group first exhaust its administrative remedies?  If the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine does not apply, should a 
court nonetheless stay the action pending administrative resolution of the 
tribal recognition question under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction? 
During the past twenty-five years, DOI’s acknowledgement 
regulations have been the subject of frequent litigation.  The answers to 
the questions presented above, and others concerning the validity, scope, 
and application of the 1978 regulations, are addressed below. 
A.  The Validity of the Regulations 
The first important consideration when reviewing the case law 
relating to the regulations is that courts uniformly have recognized that 
the regulations are the product of a lawful delegation of congressional 
authority.96  But, as written, do the regulations exceed the Secretary’s 
authority?  This was the question presented in Miami Nation of Indians 
of Indiana, Inc. v. Babbitt.97 
In Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc., the Miami Nation of 
Indians of Indiana (“the Miamis”) brought suit against the Secretary of 
the Interior and others after it was denied acknowledgment as an Indian 
tribe under the regulations.98  As part of their challenge, the Miamis 
 
 96. See  Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 255 F.3d 
342, 346 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002) (rejecting contention that regulations 
are not authorized by Congress); United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F. 3d 543, 
549 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The BIA has been delegated the authority to determine whether recognized 
status should be accorded to previously unrecognized tribes.”); Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of 
Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The BIA has the authority to prescribe 
regulations for carrying into effect any act relating to Indian affairs.”); James v. United States Dept. 
of Health and Human Serv., 824 F.2d 1132, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Congress has specifically 
authorized the Executive Branch to prescribe regulations concerning Indian affairs and relations.  
Regulations establishing procedures for federal recognition of Indian tribes certainly come within 
the area of Indian affairs and relations.”); Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. 
Norton, 217 F.Supp. 2d 76, 77 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Pursuant to  . . . [congressional] delegation of 
authority to the DOI, BIA promulgated regulations establishing procedures for federal recognition 
of Indian groups as Indian tribes.”). 
 97. 887 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D. Ind. 1995).   
 98. Id. at 1162.  This litigation proceeded in stages.  First, the court ruled that the statute of 
limitations barred the claim that the Secretary of the Interior’s decision withdrawing 
acknowledgement of the Miamis based on an 1897 decision by the Assistant Attorney General was 
ultra vires.  Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. Lujan, 832 F. Supp. 253, 253 (N.D. Ind. 1993).  
Next, the court ruled that the 1978 regulations under which the Miamis were denied 
acknowledgement were lawful.  Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. Babbitt, 887 F. Supp. 1158, 
1177 (N.D. Ind. 1995).  Lastly, the court ruled that the Department had not acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously by declining to acknowledge the Miamis as an Indian tribe.  Miami Nation of Indians 
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argued that the regulations were invalid because the requirements they 
imposed were more burdensome than those which previously existed,99 
and because they did not employ a tribal abandonment standard under 
which a tribe could prove lineal descent from the treaty tribe and 
continuous tribal organization.100  The Miamis further maintained that 
the regulations were deficient because they violated the Administrative 
Procedures Act (“APA”) by failing to explain policy issues and choices 
made in connection with their promulgation.101  Lastly, the Miamis 
argued that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
promulgating the regulations102 and that the regulations did not meet 
constitutional requirements.103  The court rejected all of these 
contentions. 
The court initially ruled that because the regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to a congressional delegation of authority,104 they 
were entitled to deference under Chevron.105  The court then found that 
 
of Ind., Inc. v. Babbitt, 112 F. Supp. 2d 742, 763 (N.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002).  
 99. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1168.  The Miamis argued that it 
was Congress’ intent to recognize all tribes and that the regulations frustrated that intent because 
“(1) the criteria became mandatory, rather than permissive; (2) the burden of proof was increased so 
that Indian tribes must provide proof from the time of first white contact of a group’s Indian 
identity; and (3) the community requirement was increased dramatically.”  Id. at 1168. 
 100. Id. at 1169.   
 101. Id. at 1170.   
 102. Id. at 1171.  Under the APA, a court’s review of regulations promulgated under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553 (2004) is limited to whether the regulations are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2004).  The Miamis argued 
that the regulations were arbitrary and capricious since they: 
(1) change[d] the criteria that were previously used to recognize tribes without 
explaining the change into policy; (2) d[id] not provide [them] or decisionmakers with 
sufficient guidance in preparing or reviewing petitions because they d[id] not define key 
terms or specify a burden of proof; and (3) d[id] not provide for a formal hearing 
including the opportunity to cross-examine the government’s experts or for an 
independent review of the government’s final determination. 
887 F. Supp. at 1171. 
 103. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1174.  The Miamis maintained that 
the regulations did not afford them procedural or substantive due process and also violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Id.   
 104. Id. at 1165.  The court found that the 1978 regulations had been promulgated under the 
authority of 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 25.  Id.  See James v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 
824 F.2d 1132, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Congress has specifically authorized the Executive Branch 
to prescribe regulations concerning Indian affairs and relations.  Regulations establishing 
procedures for federal recognition of Indian tribes certainly come within the area of Indian affairs 
and relations.”).    
 105. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1165.  In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled: 
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . 
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the regulations reflected a reasonable interpretation of the statutory 
delegation of authority to the Secretary106 and that their failure to 
explicitly include a voluntary abandonment standard for previously 
recognized Indian tribes did not render them invalid.107  As to the 
Miamis’ contention that the regulations were deficient because they 
failed to explain policy issues and choices, the court ruled that this 
contention was barred by the six-year statute of limitations governing 
such challenges.108  Lastly, the court determined that the regulations did 
not represent an unannounced change in policy, and that the lack of a 
formal hearing in connection with the final acknowledgement 
determination, as well as a few vague terms and an unclear burden of 
proof, did not render them arbitrary and capricious.109  The court also 
ruled that the regulations did not create a legitimate claim of entitlement 
that would trigger procedural protection under the due process clause,110 
 
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any 
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.  If Congress has explicitly left a gap for 
the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a 
specific provision of the statute by regulation.  Such legislative regulations are given 
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.  Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is 
implicit rather than explicit.  In such cases, a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation by the administrator 
of an agency. 
Id. at 843-44 (quotations and citations omitted).   
 106. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1168-69.  The court found that 
“Congress ha[d] not manifested an unambiguous intent to recognize all Indian tribes.”  Id. at 1169.  
Insofar as the regulations differing from past practices was concerned, given the deference owed the 
agency under Chevron, the court determined that such differences were insufficient to render the 
Secretary’s action impermissible.  Id. 
 107. Id. at 1169-70.  The court reasoned that “if the regulations establish[ed] a permissible 
method for determining that a group continues to exist as an Indian tribe, then the regulations must 
also implicitly establish a method for determining whether the tribe has been abandoned.”  Id. at 
1169.  But even if the regulations foreclosed the presumption of continued tribal existence, the tribal 
acknowledgement standard found no support in any statutory authority, it was a court-made 
doctrine, and the Secretary’s ultimate decision after a very active comment period was not 
unreasonable.  Id. at 1169-70. 
 108. Id. at 1170-71.   
 109. Id. at 1171-73.  The court found that all of the criteria in the regulations about which the 
Miamis complained “appeared in various prior acknowledgment decisions made by the 
Department.”  Id. at 1172.  Furthermore, because the APA did not mandate a hearing and Congress 
had not expressed any intent to provide for such, the absence of a hearing in the regulations did not 
render them arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 1173.   
 110. Id. at 1175.  The court reasoned that when applying the acknowledgement criteria under 
the regulations, the Assistant Secretary has “discretion both to view evidence from various sources 
and to initiate supplementary research.”  Id.  The court went on to note that “[a]lthough the 
Assistant Secretary has no discretion to refuse federal recognition once he has determined that the 
[section] 83.7 criteria have been met, the Assistant Secretary nonetheless is vested with discretion to 
determine whether those criteria have been met.”  Id.  In Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 
19
Iraola: The Administrative Tribal Recognition Process and the Courts
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
IRAOLA1.DOC 5/2/2005  9:00:12 AM 
886 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:867 
that they did not violate substantive due process since they were not 
arbitrary and capricious,111 and that they were rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose, comporting with equal protection.112  
This ruling was affirmed on appeal.113 
B.  Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
When faced with requests for judicial recognition of tribal status, 
depending on the context in which the issue is presented, courts 
routinely have invoked the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and 
exhaustion of administrative remedies to stay or dismiss actions.114  
Primary jurisdiction is a “prudential doctrine under which courts may, 
under appropriate circumstances, determine that the initial 
decisionmaking responsibility should be performed by the relevant 
agency rather than the courts.”115  It “comes into play whenever 
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a 
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of 
an administrative body[.]”116 
 
1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court in 
Greene v. Lujan, No. C89-645Z, 1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS 21737 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 1992) had not 
erred in ordering a formal adjudication under the provisions of the APA for a tribe which had sought 
and been denied recognition.  Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d at 1274-75.  The regulations in force in 
that case, however, had not yet been amended to grant the Interior Board of Indian Appeals the 
authority to order hearings before an administrative law judge if genuine issues of material fact 
needed resolution in connection with the petition.  Id. at 1275.  In litigation that ensued following 
the formal adjudication, the district court reinstated findings of the administrative law judge which 
had been rejected by the Assistant Secretary after improper contact with one of the parties’ lawyers.  
See Greene v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 1278, 1289 (W.D. Wash. 1996).  
 111. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1176.   
 112. Id. at 1177.  See United Houma Nation v. Babbitt, No. 96-2095, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10095, at *27 (D.D.C. July 8, 1997) (“Nor is this Court persuaded that the regulations, first 
implemented in 1978, exceeded the agency’s authority.”).  
 113. See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 255 F.3d 
342 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002). 
 114. Mather, supra note 1, at 1849; Ragsdale, supra note 13, at 328 (“When the courts have 
confronted tribal attempts to bypass the administrative process and to secure instead a judicial 
declaration of recognition, they have with high predictability invoked either exhaustion or primary 
jurisdiction.”) (footnotes omitted).   
 115. Syntek Semiconductor Co., LTD. v. Microchip Tech., Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 116. United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956); see Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 
258, 268 (1993) (“[The primary jurisdiction doctrine] is a doctrine specifically applicable to claims 
properly cognizable in court that contain some issue within the special competence of an 
administrative agency.”); Piney Run Preservation Assoc. v. County Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 
F.3d 255, 262 n.7 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The doctrine has been deemed to apply in circumstances in 
which federal litigation raises a difficult, technical question that falls within the expertise of a 
particular agency.”). 
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The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
different.117  It provides that “[w]here relief is available from an 
administrative agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to pursue that 
avenue of redress before proceeding to the courts; and until that recourse 
is exhausted, suit is premature and must be dismissed.”118 
The seminal case on the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies in the tribal recognition context is James v. 
United States Department of Health and Human Services.119  In James, 
the Gay Head Tribe sought federal acknowledgement without first going 
through the regulatory process, maintaining that they had been 
previously recognized in a report prepared by a Presidential Commission 
in 1822.120  In affirming the dismissal of the complaint for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the decision surrounding the 
recognition of the Gay Head Tribe “should be made in the first instance 
by the Department of the Interior since Congress ha[d] specifically 
authorized the Executive Branch to prescribe regulations concerning 
Indian affairs and relations.”121  The court reasoned that the purpose of 
the regulatory scheme would be frustrated if the “Judicial Branch made 
initial determinations of whether groups have been recognized 
previously or whether conditions for recognition currently exist.”122  
Following James, other courts have applied the doctrine in upholding the 
dismissal of claims brought by groups seeking or claiming tribal 
recognition who bypassed the regulatory framework designed to 
establish whether the group should be recognized as an Indian tribe. 123 
 
 117. See Syntek Semiconductor Co., LTD., 307 F.3d at 780-81 (“The doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction is not equivalent to the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.”); United 
States v. 43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 2d 187, 191 (D. Conn. 1999) (“Primary jurisdiction is 
distinct from, although often confused for, the doctrine of exhaustion.”).   
 118. Reiter, 507 U.S. at 269; W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 63 (“‘Exhaustion’ applies where a 
claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is 
withheld until the administrative process has run its course.”).  
 119. 824 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987).   
 120. Id. at 1133, 1137. 
 121. Id. at 1137.   
 122. Id.  In support of this proposition, the court relied on 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (2004).  824 F.2d 
at 1137. 
 123. See United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 550-51 (10th Cir. 
2001); W. Shoshone Bus. Council v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 1993); Burt Lake 
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 217 F.Supp. 2d 76, 78-79 (D.D.C. 2002).  To 
exhaust its administrative remedies, a group whose petition is denied may also need to seek review 
before the Interior Board of Indian Appeals.  See W. Shoshone Bus. Council, 1 F.3d at 1055 n.3 
(“[W]e note that Department of the Interior decisions are not final for purposes of [Section] 704 
review if they are subject to appeal to a higher authority within the department.”); cf. Connecticut ex 
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Illustrative of the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
is Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker.124  There, a group 
calling themselves the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians (“Golden 
Hill”) brought an action against various individuals and entities under 
the Nonintercourse Act125 for possession of, and rents and profits in 
connection with, certain lands in Connecticut.126  At the time of the 
action, Golden Hill had a petition for recognition pending before the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.127 The district court granted defendants’ 
motions to dismiss on the grounds that Golden Hill was required to 
exhaust the administrative procedures governing tribal recognition prior 
to seeking a judicial determination of tribal status under the 
Nonintercourse Act.128  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed, but on slightly different grounds.129 
The court of appeals found that because the BIA lacked the 
authority to adjudicate Golden Hill’s land claim--only a court had the 
power to do that--the doctrine of  exhaustion of administrative remedies 
did not appear to apply, because it requires that the claim be 
“‘cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone.’”130  
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, the court reasoned 
that the Department’s creation of a structured administrative process 
with its uniform criteria “made deference to the primary jurisdiction of 
the agency appropriate.”131  The court found that the BIA was “better 
 
rel. Town of N. Stonington v. United States Dept. of the Interior, No. 03-6142, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10172, at *4 (2d Cir. May 24, 2004) (“[U]ntil the Board’s review is complete, the plaintiffs 
neither have suffered nor will suffer harm sufficiently concrete to warrant judicial intervention in 
the BIA acknowledgment proceedings.”).  Failure to exhaust administrative remedies also will 
preclude other forms of relief such as mandamus.  See United Tribe of Shawnee Indians, 253 F.3d at 
551 n.4; W. Shoshone Bus. Council, 1 F.3d at 1059. 
 124. 39 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1994).   
 125. The Nonintercourse Act states: 
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, 
from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, 
unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the 
Constitution. 
25 U.S.C. § 177 (2004).  See generally Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 617-18 (2d 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981) (discussing history of the Nonintercourse Act).  
 126. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians, 39 F.3d at 54-55. 
 127. Id. at 55. 
 128. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. 130, 135 (D. Conn. 
1993). 
 129. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians, 39 F.3d at 56.   
 130. Id. at 58 (quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956)).  
 131. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians, 39 F.3d at 60.  Comparing the judicial 
formulation of tribal status under the case law interpreting the Nonintercourse Act with the 
Department’s regulatory criteria, the court observed: 
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qualified by virtue of its knowledge and experience to determine at the 
outset whether Golden Hill [met] the criteria for tribal status,” and that 
resolution of that question, given the pendency of Golden Hill’s petition, 
would assist the district court in its ultimate disposition of Golden Hill’s 
claims under the Nonintercourse Act.132  As a result, the court of appeals 
directed that the district court stay its proceedings pending a decision by 
the Department on Golden Hill’s recognition petition.133  Following the 
teaching of Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians, courts have stayed 
actions under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in cases involving a 
group claiming Indian tribe status under the Nonintercourse Act, and one 
claiming such status as a defense in an action seeking injunctive relief 
involving the building of a casino.134 
C.  Unreasonable Delay 
The resolution of a petition for recognition takes years.135  The 
APA imposes a nondiscretionary duty on an administrative agency to 
pass upon a matter presented to it “within a reasonable time,”136 and 
empowers a court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed.”137  While an action seeking recognition is not the 
appropriate vehicle to contest undue delay,138 relief has been sought 
 
The two standards overlap, though their application might not always yield identical 
results.  A federal agency and a district court are not like two trains, wholly unrelated to 
one another, racing down parallel tracks towards the same end.  Where a statute confers 
jurisdiction over a general subject matter to an agency and that matter is a significant 
component of a dispute properly before the court, it is desirable that the agency and the 
court  go down the same track—although at different times— to attain the statute’s ends 
by their coordinated action. 
Id. at 59.   
 132. Id. at 60.  The court’s ruling did not address whether deference to the Department would 
have been appropriate if Golden Hill had not had a petition pending.  Id.  (“We need not decide 
whether deference would be appropriate if no recognition application were pending, but deferral is 
fully warranted here where the plaintiff has already invoked BIA’s authority.”).  
 133. Id. at 60-61.  If, after eighteen months, no administrative ruling had been forthcoming 
then, upon defendant’s failure to make a showing as to why the stay should not be dissolved, the 
district court would have the authority to adjudicate the merits of the case.  Id. 
 134. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-9 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); 
United States v. 43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 2d 187, 191-95 (D. Conn. 1999).  In both of these 
cases, the groups asserting Indian tribal status had petitions pending before the Department.   
 135. See Coen, supra note 10, at 494 (“The minimum time for the decision-making process, 
from the start of active consideration of a petitioner’s documented petition, is twenty-five months.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 136. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2004). 
 137. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2004).   
 138. See Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 217 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 
(D.D.C. 2002) (“A direct suit in federal court seeking recognition . . . is not appropriate relief.”).  
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under the APA against the Department on the grounds that the decision 
regarding a recognition petition was unreasonably delayed.139  In 
assessing the reasonableness of administrative delay, a court must 
consider “the complexity of the task at hand, the significance (and 
permanence) of the outcome, and the resources available to the 
agency.”140  When the agency lacks resources and is allocating such 
resources in light of competing considerations, administrative delay, 
may not be deemed unreasonable.141 
 
 139. See, e.g., Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding 
unreasonable delay in processing of petition and directing BIA to submit proposed schedule for 
resolving petition).  The Department did not appeal the district court’s order in Muwekma where 
plaintiffs alleged they were entitled to expedited review because their tribe had been previously 
recognized.   
 140. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 
2003).  As noted by the court in Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, “[r]esolution of a claim of 
unreasonable delay is ordinarily a complicated and nuanced task requiring consideration of the 
particular facts and circumstances before the court.”  Id. at 1100.  Factors relevant to this inquiry 
include: 
any statutory timetable or other indication of the speed with which [the Congress] 
expects the agency to proceed; the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the 
delay, with particular concern for matters of human health and welfare; and the effect of 
expediting delayed action on agency activities of a competing or higher priority. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted).  See Telecomm. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing factors). 
 141. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc., 336 F.3d at 1100-01.  In some instances, 
schedules governing the processing and evaluation of the petitions of certain groups have been the 
result of court-approved or court-ordered deadlines.  See Recognition of Indian Tribes: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Senate Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Michael R. Smith, 
Director, Office of Tribal Services, U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior).  In testimony before the Senate in 
2002, one DOI official noted: 
  Court orders impact other petitioners in the process and preempt the ability of the 
Department to manage the acknowledgment program and its resources in a uniform and 
equitable basis.  They impact: i) the petitioner; ii) interested parties; iii) the general 
public; iv) the nature and quality of the review of the petition; v) those petitioners on 
active consideration; vi)those petitioners with higher priority on the ready list; and vii) 
the ability of the Department to manage the acknowledgment program and its resources.     
  By requiring the Department to give priority to one petition over another, court orders 
have forced us to divert limited resources.  Based upon our experience, our adherence to 
the Court orders has interrupted, delayed, and adversely impacted the petitioners 
currently on active consideration and those who are high on the ready list and entitled to 
priority in consideration over petitioners under Court orders. 
  Court orders also adversely impact interested parties and the petitioners themselves.  
The interested parties identified with a specific petition include the states, states 
Attorneys General, surrounding towns, and recognized tribes.  Certain court orders 
require the Department to prioritize petitions and truncate the time-frames in the 
regulations for interested parties and petitioners to submit comments on the proposed 
finding and to receive technical assistance. Court orders abbreviate the time period for 
responding to comments and accelerate the completion of the proposed findings and 
final determinations. 
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D.  Substantive Challenges 
The Department’s final determination142 with respect to the 
recognition of a group as an Indian tribe is subject to judicial review 
under the APA.143  Specifically, under section 706(2)(a), a final decision 
may be not be disturbed unless it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”144  To 
date, courts consistently have affirmed administrative decisions by the 
Department declining to recognize petitioning groups as Indian tribes as 
being not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or in violation of 
law.145 
E.  Summary of the Evolving Case Law 
Litigation involving the acknowledgment regulations over the 
course of the past twenty-five years has established certain principles.  
First, the regulations are the product of a lawful delegation of 
congressional authority146 and, as written, they do not exceed the 
 
Id.  See Coen, supra note 10, at 503 (“In recent hearings on the acknowledgment process, Congress 
acknowledged its responsibility for the limited funding available to the [OFA (previously BAR)] 
and asked extensive questions concerning the recent judicial branch decisions that impacted the 
priorities and time periods established in the regulations.”).   
 142. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text. 
 143. See, e.g., Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 255 
F.3d 342, 348-49 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002) (indicating that interpretation 
or application of acknowledgment regulations is subject to judicial review under the APA).  See 
also Toulou Testimony, supra note 2 (“[the Secretary of the Interior’s] determinations are subject to 
challenge under the Administrative Procedures Act . . . with regard to whether a group has properly 
been denied, or granted, acknowledgment.”). 
 144. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2004). 
 145. See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. Babbitt, 112 F. Supp. 2d 742 (N.D. Ind. 
2000), aff’d, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002); Ramapough 
Mountain Indians v. Norton, No. 00-5464, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27805 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 2001), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 817 (2002).  On the rulemaking front, the court in United Houma Nation v. 
Babbitt, No. 96-2095, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10095, at *33 (D.D.C. July 8, 1997), held that the 
“Department’s decision to not initiate a rulemaking to change its regulations based on . . . 
amendments [to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934] [could] not be considered  as arbitrary and 
capricious or contrary to law.” 
 146. See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. United States Dep’t. of the Interior, 255 F.3d 
342, 346 (7th Cir. 2001), (rejecting contention that regulations are not authorized by Congress); 
United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 549 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The BIA 
has been delegated the authority to determine whether recognized status should be accorded to 
previously unrecognized tribes.”); Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 
59 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The BIA has the authority to prescribe regulations for carrying into effect any 
act relating to Indian affairs.”); James v. United States Dep’t. of Health and Human Serv., 824 F.2d 
1132, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Congress has specifically authorized the Executive Branch to 
prescribe regulations concerning Indian affairs and relations.  Regulations establishing procedures 
for federal recognition of Indian tribes certainly come within the area of Indian affairs and 
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Secretary’s authority.147  Second, when faced with requests for judicial 
recognition of tribal status, depending on whether the issue is raised 
directly or derivatively, courts will stay or dismiss actions pending a 
determination on the recognition question by the Department by 
invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,148 or that of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies.149  Third, actions alleging unreasonable delay 
in the administrative recognition process face the difficult hurdle of 
demonstrating that lack of resources and competing considerations are 
not the principal reason for delay.150  Finally, groups that have been 
denied recognition confront the challenge of demonstrating that the 
Department’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or in violation of law--a stringent standard to meet.151 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Department of the Interior’s regulations governing tribal 
acknowledgment have been the subject of criticism from several fronts.  
In 2001, for example, the Government Accounting Office issued a report 
criticizing the federal acknowledgement process’s lack of transparency 
and delay.152  Commentators have disparaged the regulations as being 
 
relations.”); Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa v. Norton, 217 F.Supp. 2d 76, 77 (D.D.C. 
2002) (“Pursuant to  . . . [congressional] delegation of authority to the DOI, BIA promulgated 
regulations establishing procedures for federal recognition of Indian groups as Indian tribes.”). 
 147. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. v. Babbitt, 887 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D. Ind. 1995); United  
Houma Nation v. Babbitt, No. 96-2095, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10095, at *27 (D.D.C. July 8, 
1997).   
 148. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1994); 
New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-9 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. 
43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 2d 187, 191-95 (D. Conn. 1999).  In all three cases, petitions for 
recognition were pending before the Department at the time of the litigation.   
 149. See United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 550-51 (10th Cir. 
2001); W. Shoshone Business Council v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 1993); James v. 
United States Dept. of Health and Human Services, 824 F.2d 1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Burt 
Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 217 F.Supp. 2d 76, 78-79 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 150. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100-01 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003).   
 151. See Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. Babbitt, 112 F. Supp. 2d 742 (N.D. Ind. 
2000), aff’d, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002) (affirming decision of 
Department refusing to recognize group as a tribe); Ramapough Mountain Indians v. Norton, No. 
00-5464, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27805 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 817 
(2002).  See generally Wilkins v. Sec’y of the Interior, 995 F.2d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Federal 
courts must defer to any reasonable interpretation given to the statute by the agency charged with its 
administration, as well as to the agency’s interpretations and applications of its regulations and 
policies in carrying out its statutory duties, unless plainly erroneous.”) (internal quotation omitted).    
  
 152. See GAO Report 02-49, supra note 3, at 10 (“[C]learer guidance is needed on the key 
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vague and imprecise,153 creating a “bureaucratic morass,”154 and 
producing a “recognition process that is exorbitant and time-
consuming.”155  Some maintain that gaming concerns improperly 
influence the recognition process.156  Congress also has conducted 
numerous oversight hearings157 and regularly proposed legislation to 
remedy perceived deficiencies in the regulatory acknowledgment 
process, but such legislation has never passed.158 
 
aspect of the criteria and supporting evidence used in recognition decisions. . . . Second, the process 
is also hampered by limited resources, a lack of time frames, and ineffective procedures for 
providing information to interested third parties.”).   
 153. See, e.g., Jack Campisi, Reflections on the Last Quarter Century of Tribal Recognition, 37 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 505, 509 (2003) (“[T]he root of the problem, the cause of the excess, rests 
squarely on the vagueness and imprecision of the language of the regulations.”); Paschal, supra note 
9, at 227 (“The BIA is using evidence inconsistently and employing vague, unquantified standards 
to arrive at unreviewable conclusions.”).  But see Hearings Before the House Comm. on 
Government Reform, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (testimony of the Honorable Earl E. Devaney, Inspector 
General for the Department of the Interior) (“While this process has been harshly criticized for its 
lack of transparency, based on our experience, it is, relatively speaking, one of the more transparent 
processes in DOI, especially after several recent changes to the program.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Sockbeson, supra note 20, at 489 (referring to his personal experiences with the 
“incredibly time-consuming process” involved in achieving recognition for the Wampanoag Tribe 
of Gay Head). 
 155. Kim, supra note 2, at 913.   
 156. See, e.g., Alex Fryer, Some Tribes Still See Promises Broken, Dreams Thwarted, SEATTLE 
TIMES, May 3, 2004 (“The most strident opposition to a tribe’s petition often comes from 
established tribes . . . which worry about threats to revenues generated by their casinos.  Those 
tribes sometimes flood the BIA with information arguing against recognition for a new tribe.”); 
Katherine H. Scott, Tribal Process Called Corrupt; Congressional Panel Hears Claims that Casino 
Interests Influence the Process, NORWICH BULLETIN, May 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.norwichbulletin.com/news/stories/20040506/localnews/361859.html (“Connecticut 
lawmakers have said the Bureau of Indian Affairs seem to act slower on recognition petitions from 
tribes that have no plans to open a casino, while tribes with casino plans and backing from deep-
pocketed investors are put on a fast track.”); Angie Wagner, Home of Their Ancestors is Left 
Unprotected, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIBUNE, June 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.startribune.com/viewers/story.php?template=print_a&story=4812586 (last visited June 
7, 2004) (reporting how a tribe that has declined to apply for recognition “believe[s] one reason the 
process is so slow is because the government assumes tribes just want to open casinos”).  But see 
Campisi, supra note 153, at 507-08 (“A cursory examination of the list of petitioners illustrates that 
the vast majority submitted letters of intent to petition well before the Cabazon case and the passage 
of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, as well as the American Indian Policy Review Commission 
report that was published in 1976.”) (footnotes omitted); Kim supra note 2, at 904 n.23 (“The recent 
backlash against Indian casinos hurts Indian groups that seek acknowledgment; however, Indian 
groups have petitioned for recognition long before Indian casinos became popular.”). 
 157. Kim, supra note 2, at 900 n.7 (“The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held hearings on 
the Federal Acknowledgment process (FAP) in 1978, 1983, 1988, 1989, 1992, and 1995.”).  
 158. See Rosier Testimony, supra note 30, at 2 (“For the past few years, Congress has 
considered legislation almost annually to modify the criteria for groups seeking acknowledgment as 
Indian tribes or to remove the process altogether from the Department.”); Myers, supra note 15, at 
285 (discussing proposed legislation); Ragsdale, supra note 13, at 341-43 (discussing the proposed 
Indian Federal Recognition Procedure Act of 1999 and the possibility of creating an independent 
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In September 2002, in response to the GAO Report, the Department 
implemented a Strategic Plan to address the deficiencies identified.159  
Many of the action items in the plan were completed by May 2004, and 
the Department is committed to finishing the remaining tasks.160  At 
some point, Congress may change the administrative recognition 
process.  Until then, review of final administrative decisions regarding 
the recognition of Indian groups as tribes will, as with other areas of 
administrative law, lie with the courts. 
 
commission with “legislatively established” criteria so closely resembling 25 CFR Part 83 that few 
advantages seem likely from the proposed change). 
 159. See Campisi, supra note 153, at 509-10 (discussing submission of Strategic Plan to 
Congress); see Coen supra note 10, at 500 (discussing “plan to make acknowledgment precedents 
more accessible and to provide clearer guidelines to the regulations in order to ensure consistency in 
the decisions and to improve public understanding of, and public confidence in, the 
acknowledgment decisions.”) (footnote omitted).   
 160. See Rosier Testimony, supra note 30, at 4 (“[T]he Department has completed many of the 
action items identified in the strategic plan.  We plan to have all remaining tasks . . . completed by 
this fall. We do recognize . . . that some tasks will take longer to implement because they may 
require congressional action, regulatory amendment, or access to the Internet.”). 
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